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EU scholars have studied mobilization as a cross-level phenomenon. Individuals and organized 
interests seek preliminary rulings with the Court of Justice of the EU to challenge national rules. 
Likewise, the Commission takes member states to court where they infringe commonly agreed 
rules. However, litigation can also run horizontally in the EU system. EU institutions can go to 
court to annul actions of other EU institutions. Studying this so far neglected phenomenon of 
litigation, the paper analyses differences in mobilization across European Parliament, Council 
and Commission. To this aim it conceptualizes litigation decisions as resulting from an interplay 
of agency and structure. Decision-making within organizations and in the EU political system 
as well as different motivations of actors are presented to explain differences in horizontal 
litigation. Methodologically the analysis combines a database covering 160 horizontal 
annulment conflicts (1957 to 2017) and case studies based on expert interviews. 
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In the EU multilevel system, scholars typically study legal mobilization from a cross-level 
perspective. Individuals and organized interests at the national level seek preliminary rulings to 
challenge the interpretation of EU rules by other national actors via preliminary rulings. 
Likewise, the Commission takes member states to court where they infringe commonly agreed 
rules and standards. However, litigation can also run horizontally in the EU multilevel system. 
At the EU level, institutions can ask the Court to annul actions of other EU institutions for lack 
of competence or breach of procedural rules. Who are the EU-level actors that go to court in 
such horizontal conflicts and which factors contribute to understanding the litigation patterns 
that emerge across the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (Commission) 
and the Council? 
In addressing this question, the paper has two goals. First, it raises attention for a so far 
neglected group of litigants. Existing research highlighting the power of litigants and the logics 
of mobilization focuses on organized interests as well as sometimes on individuals (Dumas 
2017; Evans Case and Givens 2010; Slepcevic 2009; Hilson 2002). Private economic 
actorssuch as companies (Adam 2016) as well as public actors are hardly analyzed (but see 
Bauer and Mathieu in this volume, as well as Granger 2004; Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). 
Research on EU institutions as litigants has been limited to the Commission launching 
infringement actions (e.g. Hofmann 2013). Other EU institutions such as the EP or the Council 
have not been studied. Thus, an analysis of litigation by EU institutions against EU institutions 
allows complementing existing legal mobilization research in terms of actor constellations. At 
a time where the rise of tensions and crises on the global scene has intensified the potential for 
conflict within the EU, developing this line of reasoning is particularly relevant. 
Second, the paper explores causes for differences in litigation activity. Litigation is understood 
as a channel to articulate interests. Structural as well as agency-based factors influence the 
usage of this channel. Theoretically, structural factors matter because they constitute the 
conditions under which litigation decisions are taken, and thus render a decision to litigate more 
or less likely. Following the structural perspective country differences in litigation activity have 
been assigned to political (Kitschelt 1986; Epp 1998) and legal opportunity structures (Alter 
and Vargas 2000; Vanhala 2011; Andersen 2005; Conant et al. 2017). Coming to grips with the 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the CES 2017 conference in Glasgow. I would like to 
thank the participants, in particular Andreas Hofmann, and two annonymous reviewers for constructive criticism 
and valuable comments. Tobias Hübler provided excellent research assistance. 
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explanatory power and the causal connections between these diverse sets of structural factors 
is challenging. Methodologically, focusing horizontal annulment actions allows keeping some 
of the structural factors constant. Therewith, the paper has the potential to bring out more clearly 
the relevance of others. In particular, I draw on organizational structures within the litigant 
institutions and the EU political system. EP, Commission and Council differ regarding how 
decisions to go to Court are taken internally. In order to litigate, the EP needs support in the 
plenary and the Council even unanimity among its 28 member states. Inside the Commission 
the organization of a decision to go to Court is much less prone to blockage. Similarly, the 
organization of decision-taking in the EU political system structures who is more likely to use 
litigation. Where EP and Council act as co-legislators and take the final vote, they have little 
incentives to go to Court. This is different for the Commission whose role is that of an agenda-
setter. In addition, in areas where the Parliament is not a co-legislator the legal avenue gains 
attractiveness to secure interests. Thus, organizational features of decision-taking in the EU and 
inside its main institutions differ. Yet, as such organizational structures do not create litigation. 
It is where actor’s motivations interact with organizational features that we can use their 
explanatory power to understand legal mobilization. Here public actors have so far received 
least attention. Powerful examples exist how private norm entrepreneurs have pushed forward 
particular ideological positions via litigation (e.g. Cichowski 2004). Enterprises in turn, 
frequently go to court to secure financial benefits (e.g. Gould 1973). I theorize litigation 
motivations by drawing on classical agency concepts of public policy scholars. Three actor 
motivations to litigate are developed as ideal types and exemplified on the basis of two short 
case studies each: material gains, policy goals and institutional interests. Our material does not 
allow to systematically assess the relative importance of the different motivations. Yet, it 
emerges that clear-cut material and institutional motivations allow for legal mobilization even 
where the internal organizational process to decide to go to Court is demanding. More complex 
and potentially controversial policy motives, in turn, lead to legal mobilization where the 
organizational structure across and inside institutions provides greater opportunities to take the 
legal avenue. Combining the argument that organizational structures matter with these different 
motivations is quite powerful in explaining differences in litigation patterns between EU 
institutions.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, I introduce annulment actions as a category 
of cases and present the data I use to describe differences in recourse to horizontal litigation 
across EP, Commission and Council (2). Against this puzzle, chapter 3 conceptualizes litigation 
as an interplay of opportunity structures and agency, while focusing on the organizational 
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structures as a feature that has so far received little attention in litigation research. Next, I 
empirically discuss opportunity structures EP, Commission and Council face when deciding to 
litigate (4) before I develop and illustrate three motivations that typically characterize horizontal 
litigation (5). The conclusion summarizes the main points and discusses implications for future 
research (6). 
 
2 Annulment actions and horizontal litigation 
In the EU, there are three main types of legal procedures: infringements, preliminary rulings 
and annulment actions. Scholarly attention has focused on infringement procedures and 
preliminary rulings. The Commission can launch infringement procedures against member 
states for breach of community law. Preliminary rulings in turn assure consistent interpretation 
and application of EU law in the member state. Here, cases emerge bottom up and typically 
confront individuals or organized interests with national governments. Thus, both procedures 
indicate vertical conflicts running between the different levels of the EU system. 
Annulment actions, in contrast, have received less scholarly attention (but see Adam 2016; 
Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). Historically, annulments have their origin in the interest to provide 
checks and balances to EU institutions – particularly to the High Authority. The Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (today Court of Justice of the European Union) “shall review the 
legality of legislative acts [other than recommendations and opinions]” (Art. 263 TFEU). They 
allow private and public, national as well as EU level actors to seek annulment of actions of EU 
institutions. Thus, in annulment actions the defendant is per definition always an EU institution, 
most importantly the EP, the Commission or the Council. Other EU institutions, such as the 
European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank, can also be subject to annulment 
actions– but this is rarely the case (Hartlapp, forthcoming). The grounds on which their acts can 
be challenged are a “lack of competence”, i.e. action where no competences have been 
transferred or in case of breach of the institutional balance, “infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement” such as consultation, or “of any rule of law relating to the […] 
application” of the Treaty such as principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations and, 
finally, for “misuse of powers”. Who are the litigants in annulment actions? 
Figure 1 shows an overall increasing number of annulments, in particular since the 1980s. 
Private actors are clearly the most important litigant group. Litigation by public actors from the 
national level (member state governments and regional entities) has been in decline in the last 
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15 years. Public actors at the EU level, in contrast, have become the second most important 
group of claimants. This particularly dynamic group of litigant actors forms the empirical core 
of this paper. 
 
Figure 1: Annulment actions by type of claimant (1960-2012) 
Sources: Adam et al. (forthcoming, chapter 1) 
 
A new comprehensive data set was build that covers all horizontal annulment actions since the 
EU’s founding days. To this aim, we extracted cases from the Stone Sweet and Brunell (2007) 
Data Set on Actions under Article 230: 1954-2006 that display EU institutions as plaintiffs as 
well as defendants. The selection was updated from CURIA and EURLex (2006 up to 
31.12.2017) and information was added e.g. on the title and substance of the case to allow 
assessing differences across policy fields. There is a total of 160 court rulings; a ruling may 
combine court cases and there can be more than one claimant to a case.2 Descriptive information 
for litigant activity in horizontal conflict comes directly from this database. 
In the analysis, I combine these insights with mobilization research and related EU studies as 
well as with original material from expert interviews. Five semi-structured interviews were 
carried out in June 2016 with officials from policy departments and legal services (SJ) in the 
                                                 
2 There are twelve cases in total with two claimants (C-103/12, joint cases C-124 & 125/13, C-132 to 
136/14) or defendants (C-181/91, C-378/00, C-178/03, C-122/04, C-299/05, C-411/06, C-427/12, C-43/12, C-
88/14). All cases can be accessed via the webpage of the Court: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/ 
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EU institutions (see annex). Interview material is combined with a careful reading of rulings 
and accompanying material such as press releases, legal opinions and secondary sources. 
 
3 Conceptualizing litigation while accounting for organisational 
differences 
Litigation can be conceptualized as a channel to articulate interests. Usage of this channel is 
influenced by an interplay of structural and agency-based factors. Mobilization and 
implementation scholars provide for a rich list of structural factors rendering litigation more or 
less likely. Simplifying somewhat, the literature distinguishes political and legal opportunity 
structures that influence actors’ decisions to turn conflict into litigation. In his classical study 
on anti-nuclear protest movements Kitschelt (1986) showed that differences in the openness of 
national political systems for input and differences in their capacity to implement policies shape 
the level of protest (cf. also Epp 1998). Where more access points exist in a political system, 
e.g. through separation of powers between executive and legislature or decentralization of the 
state, there are fewer structural opportunities for protest and litigation. 
Legal opportunity structures, in turn, comprise two elements of national legal systems: access 
to courts and ‘legal stock’ (Vanhala 2011; Hilson 2002). Access is enabled or constrained by 
laws on locus standi or standing rights of the claimant to file suits, court control of their docket 
or length of procedures as well as by legal cost rules. While emphasis varies across countries, 
there is consensus that high costs as well as the risk to bear the others’ costs when losing a case 
(“English rule”) render litigation less attractive (Evans Case and Givens 2010; Hilson 2002). 
Weak or unclear standing rights – that is the right to sue – can impede actors from litigating, as 
can legal representation requirements (Vanhala 2011). In addition, available precedent or 
statutory basis to which the conflict can be linked matter. This “legal stock” helps jurists to 
formulate and carry through a legal challenge (Andersen 2005). 
Such political and legal opportunity structures have also been studied for the EU. Granger 
(2013: 62–3) describes how the organization of legal action at the level of the national 
administrative and political systems influences whether or not member states are likely to join 
as interveners before the CJEU. Other scholars have highlighted how the EU has empowered 
weak actors representing diffuse interests in areas such as environmental policy, consumer 
rights or equal treatment (Alter and Vargas 2000; Tesoka 1999; Hilson 2002). Access to courts 
has been strengthened directly by shifting burden of proof (e.g. in EU anti-discrimination 
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directives) and indirectly by increasing information and support on legal questions e.g. when 
setting up supportive bodies and counselling or when slowly altering discourse via expert 
lawyer networks (Falkner et al. 2005; Hartlapp 2008; Hofmann 2013). 
These works on political and legal opportunity structures have substantially improved our 
understanding of what shapes decisions to go to Court. However, much of this research is 
interested in explaining cross country variation. Explanations focus on national level factors 
(but see recently Kelemen and Pavone 2016 for subnational variation), which in turn limits 
explanatory power for differences within the same politico-legal system. And as litigants are 
typically private actors, the political opportunity structure remains an exogenous factor. Where 
litigants are part of the political system themselves, however, this outsider perspective might 
be misleading. Organizational theory seems particularly promising to complement these 
existing perspectives with a more fine-grained approach that captures differences within the EU 
political and legal system. 
Organizational theory assumes that institutions are not unitary actors. Rather, “actors in 
organizations have preferences and intentions […] which they attempt to have implemented” 
(Pfeffer 1981: 29). Research seeks to explain how “the goals to be achieved, the rules the 
members of the organization are expected to follow, and the status structure that defines the 
relations between them” structures their behavior (e.g. Murdoch 2015: 1677). Consequently, 
organizational structures can be expected to bring out differences in the constraints public actors 
face when litigating against each other in two regards. 
First, across the EU as an organization the EU institutions are endowed with a particular role 
and ensuing rights in decision-taking. Such opportunities matter for how much influence an 
actor can take in a decision in a first place. Indirectly, they also influence the decision to seek 
annulment of this decision later on. Thus, we can give the political opportunity structure 
argument an organizational turn. Organizational structure influences who has a right to propose 
legislation, shapes its substance and decides about adoption. In particular, the final decision-
takers should be less likely to go to Court to seek annulment of EU decisions.  
Second, research has demonstrated that the EU institutions are far from being unitary actors 
(e.g. Hartlapp et al. 2014). Who are the actors that decide inside the litigating institution? Where 
are decisions for litigation taken under which rules? Organizational structures influence who 
has a right to decide or to veto a decision. Where multiple actors have to agree on a decision, 
or where unanimity is required to go to court, claimants are less likely to launch a case. Actors 
at the political top are more likely to be receptive to public debate. In contrast, we can expect 
8 
 
officials working in the administration to give more weight to technical arguments when 
deciding to turn conflict into litigation (Weber [1925] 1978). 
In sum, across the EU institutions and inside EU institutions organizational reasoning can 
complement existing opportunity structure explanations. Against these expectations it is to 
empirical insights on horizontal annulments in the EU political system that we now turn. 
 
4 Assessing litigation empirically while accounting for organisational 
differences 
Figure 2 displays differences in annulment actions by European Parliament (PARL), 
Commission (COMM) and Council (CONS). It demonstrates how frequently the claimant 
launches annulment actions against another EU institution. 
 
Figure 2: Annulment actions by EU institution (1960-2017, N=160) 
Sources: own collection based on Stone Sweet, Brunell (2007) & CURIA (cut off 31/12/2017) 
 
Horizontal annulments are in their majority lodged by the Commission (90 cases, 56%). The 
second most active plaintiff is the EP (60 cases, 38%). The Council lodged annulment 
complaints against other EU institutions in ten cases only (6%). These differences in 
mobilization across EP, Commission and Council render exploration of the causes promising. 















detailed analysis of the contribution organizational structure can make to understanding these 
litigation patterns. 
The literature has highlighted access to court and legal stock as relevant explanations shaping 
legal mobilization. The control the Court of Justice of the European Union can exert over its 
docket as well as the length of procedure does not differ across EU institutions. For any EU act, 
claimants have a time period of two months to decide whether they want to seek annulment in 
court. Cases launched by the Council take on average nine months, by the Commission 20 
months and those initiated in the EP 22 months. In principle shorter procedures should 
incentivize the Council to go to Court more often. However, interview material does not 
indicate that these differences affect decisions to litigate. Rather they are due to the different 
complexity and substance of cases. More importantly, historically, standing rights differed 
across the three institutions. Originally only the Commission and the Council enjoyed full rights 
to file suits. When Article 263 was written, they were given privileged applicants rights to sue 
other institutions via annulment actions. The EP did not hold such ‘privileged applicant’ rights. 
It could litigate only where it could argue that the case was relevant to protect its prerogatives. 
Starting in the late 1970s (C-302/78), case law successively established the right of the EP to 
use annulments passively (C-294/83) and actively. Having gradually gained greater power in 
the legislative process, the Parliament found itself unable to protect its new prerogatives. To 
remedy this procedural gap, the Court started to systematically admit annulment actions brought 
by Parliament (C-70/88). The Maastricht Treaty follows up on these increased standing rights 
by formally according the EP privileged actor’s status to sue in Court (EP_1). These differences 
in standing rights can contribute to a better understanding why propensity to litigate was lower 
for the EP in the early decades of the integration process. Legal cost rules do not differ across 
claimants. Formally, in annulment decisions, the English rule applies. This means that the party 
losing the case has to bear the attorney costs of the other party. Yet, interview partners explained 
that de facto annulments do not generate any costs other than the time in-house lawyers have to 
invest in preparing and defending a case and travelling costs to go to Luxembourg. Among EU 
institutions, an unwritten agreement exists that when going to Court, “every party carries its 
own costs” (CONS_1, similarly COM_1 and EP_1). What does matter, is the relative size of 
the legal service, though. Strictly speaking, manpower of a claimant is not a feature of the legal 
system. Yet, we argue that it matters when assessing the legal opportunity structure as it is an 
indirect indicator for the legal costs incurred for a potential litigant. If the absolute number of 
officials dealing with annulments is smaller, relative costs of launching cases are higher in terms 
of manpower. Staff numbers of the legal services differ strongly across the EU institutions. The 
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Commission legal service counts 385 plan posts, the Council 244 and the Parliament 68.3 These 
differences were mentioned as a relevant factor in decisions to go to Court in particular for the 
understaffed EP legal service (EP_1, COM_2). 
There are no indications that legal stock differs systematically across litigant institutions. Legal 
sociological research on the EU system has characterized the group of EU lawyers as relatively 
small and homogenous. Jacquè (2013: 44) describes an “inner circle” of ca. 200 lawyers "who 
know each other inside out and are used to working together notwithstanding their institutional 
background" (similarly Vauchez 2015; Bailleux 2013). Moreover, interviewees described 
exchanges among the legal services of the three institutions as frequent and friendly (COM_2, 
CONS_1). Thus, there are no signs that legal culture systematically differs across the three 
institutions studied. Rather evidence points at a united legal culture, aptly using legal stock 
produced within a homogenous legal community. 
Table 1 summarizes the legal opportunity structures. EU institutions are provided with similar 
incentives to litigate regarding control of the docket, costs as well as legal stock and culture. 
Differences regarding the length of procedure do not seem to hold explanatory power. 
Differences in manpower as well as the historically limited standing right of Parliament, in turn, 
seem to matter for differences between Commission and Parliament in particular. The 
substantially lower litigation motivation of the Council in turn requests additional explanations. 
In section 3 we argued that organizational features shape who are the actors that decide and 
where a decision is taken under which rules. Therefore, we now turn to organizational structures 
inside and across EU institutions that matter for legal mobilization. 
                                                 
3 Number are taken from the most recent Annual Activity Reports from the legal services of the Parliament 
(2015), Commission (2016) and the Council (2016). Administrative support is excluded. 
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 European Parliament European 
Commission 
Council 
legal opportunity structure 
length of procedure 
(average) 
22 months 20 months 9 months 
costs de facto bearing of own cost 
manpower 68 385 244 
standing rights until 1992: limited to 
protect prerogative 
since 1992: privileged 
applicant 
privileged applicant privileged applicant 
legal stock and 
culture 
consensual disregarding institutional background 
organizational structure 
across institutions co-legislator agenda-setter co-legislator 
inside institutions Plenary, prepared by 
SJ via legal affairs 
committee 
College, prepared by 
SJ 
COREPER in 
collaboration with SJ 
Table 1: Legal and organizational opportunity structures for horizontal litigation 
 
The legislative architecture of the EU system provides the three EU institutions with different 
roles. Typically, the Commission acts as agenda setter and proposes a policy measure. 
Depending on the legislative procedure, the Council or the Council and the EP adopt the policy. 
Having the final say in the legislative process, incentives for the Council are low to use litigation 
as a means to secure a position. In contrast, when the Council or the Council and the Parliament 
adopted substantial changes on an act and the Commission would like to see EU policy return 
on the position it had proposed initially, annulments become an attractive channel to do so 
‘through the backdoor’. Consequently, the Council is a defender rather than a plaintiff in 
annulment actions between the institutions.4 The role of the EP in the decision-making process 
has changed over time. The Nice Treaty turned the Parliament into a fully-fledged co-legislator 
and changed its role from loyal ally of the Commission to a more distant player. In sum, the 
Commission faces strongest incentives to mobilize and the EP does so increasingly, in particular 
since the Maastricht treaty. 
Important differences prevail in terms of internal decision taking, too. The Commission is 
structured into policy Directorates General (DGs) and services. The legal service (SJ) prepares 
                                                 
4 What is more, Member States may simply abstain from Council activity and act multi- or unilaterally. 
Such strategies may be less costly in terms of resources and offer more certainty about the positions pursued. 
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and leads all legal proceedings, including annulment actions. The SJ is part of the Secretariat 
General (SG) and has been described as the oldest and “best known” legal service of the 
institutions (Jacqué 2013: 44; also Bailleux 2013). Decisions to go to Court, i.e. to launch an 
annulment action, are taken by the highest political forum, the College of Commissioners. 
Nevertheless, the SJ has substantial leeway in deciding to mobilize the law. In the SJ, 
infringements and preliminary rulings are typically run by desk officers. “[F]ormulation of an 
intervention take place at a lower level within the hierarchy” (Hofmann 2013: 78). Annulments, 
in contrast, are directly dealt with by the Director General of the SJ “because they are legally 
important” (COM_1). They allow for a more direct impact, rendering them more suitable as 
instruments for strategic policy-influence. Where “fundamental judicial questions and positions 
are at stake we cannot wait for a preliminary ruling to come up” (COM_1, similarly COM_2). 
Rather than between the political and the administrative level within the SJ, tensions sometimes 
emerge vis-à-vis the centre (SJ) and the responsible policy DG (Hofmann 2013: 78–9; Hartlapp 
et al. 2014: 255-258). Typically, the policy DG is eager to secure accomplishments from the 
legislative process and thus prefers other channels such as “a protocol explaining why we regret 
a decision or why we consider it unlawful – but not in Court” (COM_2). In sum, inside the 
Commission the SJ takes the decision to mobilize the law embedded in a complex organization 
but largely independent. 
The European Parliament also knows differences between the political body composed of 
MEPs and its administrative section. The administrative body has grown over time and officials 
have turned from “paper keepers” to “policy shapers” (Neuhold and Dobbels 2014). This also 
applies to the legal service which provides legal advice to the committees and goes to 
Luxembourg to represent the EP in court. Growing standing rights have empowered the legal 
service within the institution (see above). However, to mobilize the law political authority is 
needed: “our basis for acting is the plenary resolution […] because obviously we cannot decide 
by ourselves to launch an action” (EP_1). Once this decision is taken, the position itself is 
decided by the EP president. (S)he is acting based on a recommendation of the legal affairs 
committee. An interviewee explained that in practice the SJ strongly influences this position: 
“We explain the situation and what the possible options are, what the deadlines are. Then, this 
note is discussed in a meeting and the committee takes a decision - they vote. And if they agree 
to go to Court we make a recommendation for the president” (EP_1). In sum, launching an 
annulment requires political support in Parliament, while the factual legal cause is prepared by 
the SJ rather independently. 
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The Council secretariat is characterized by confidentiality, working as a broker in the 
background (Christiansen 2002: 81–2). To take an active role and mobilize the law, the SJ needs 
a specific authorization of the Member States. In these cases, discussions take place informally 
between the SJ and the COREPER working group level to elaborate a) whether to go for an 
annulment case rather than pursuing other options to solve the conflict and b) what should be 
the line of argumentation. Consequently, the Council only goes for a case if there is “a very 
clear majority among the member states” (CONS_1). Individual interests or positions 
questioning a majority do not make it through the internal decision process. Given that 
consensus among all 28 national delegations in the COREPER working group is required to go 
forward with an annulment action, mobilization is likely to take place only in exceptional cases. 
In sum, compared to EP and Commission, the Council is more constrained in its decisions to 
litigate. 
Overall, organizational structures inside and across EU institutions add to our understanding of 
legal mobilization in horizontal annulment actions. In the legislative process the Council can 
assure its positions most easily. The Commission as agenda-setter, in contrast, faces strongest 
incentives to mobilize and the EP does so increasingly, in particular since the Maastricht treaty. 
Internal decision taking provides the Commission with most room to launch annulment actions, 
the Parliament is somewhat constrained by a possible negative vote in the plenary while the 
Council needs proactive agreement from all member states to launch an annulment. However, 
the analysis also showes that ultimately actors take the decisions to go to court – agency matters. 
In the following we will explore motivations underlying litigation and discuss how they link to 
the opportunity structures shaping these litigation decisions. 
 
5 Exploring different motivations within the EU institutions 
Motivations of political actors are often at the heart of studies trying to understand the 
functioning of political systems and policy-making. Yet, there is no general theory on behavior 
or preferences of actors when going to court. Starting from the general assumption that rational 
actors seek to maximize their interests, particularly among public actors there are huge 
differences in what these goals are. In line with the focus on horizontal annulments we will 
distinguish a material motivation, a policy orientation or an institutional logic (for vertical 
conflicts cf. Bauer and Mathieu in this volume). These three motivations are adapted from a 
general conceptualization of actor motivations in annulment conflicts (Adam et al. 
forthcoming). Each motivation will be conceptualized before it is linked to existing litigation 
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research and illustrated ‘at play’ with two empirical cases from our sample. Analytically 
distinct, these illustrations show that empirically motivations frequently co-exist in one case. 
5.1 Material gains 
A basic assumption about individual behaviour is that decisions are taken to maximize material 
well-being. Grounded in economic theories, litigation studies have searched the conditions 
under which private actors go to courts instead of solving conflicts via settlement or other types 
of conflict resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration (e.g. Gould 1973). Authors share the 
assumption that litigants are driven by an interest to maximise wealth. They examine the impact 
of information asymmetry, legal procedures, and probabilities to win on the perception of 
material benefits when deciding to go to court (Bebchuk 1984). 
Wealth maximisation is obviously of particular relevance for understanding the behaviour of 
private actors—attempting to further their economic aims with the help of litigation. However, 
public actors, too, care about “their” budgets. Individual material gains can be crucial to explain 
public decisions (Downs 1966/1967). And, at an aggregate level, bureaucracies can be self-
aggrandizing actors, searching to maximise their budget and expand their services (Niskanen 
1971). For private and public actors alike, the motivational logic behind material resource 
protection or expansion is simple: annulment actions motivated by financial resources aim at 
revoking a decision of EU institutions that has a negative impact on another institution’s budget. 
While the overall EU budget is rather limited, many decisions do have budgetary implications. 
What is more, as in any polity, budgetary negotiations are ridden with inter-institutional 
conflict. In these conflicts the EP has frequently used judicial review to assure or expand its 
budgetary prerogatives. In sum, material motivation should matter for all EU institutions and 
particularly where they decide about or implement distributive instruments or regulatory 
instruments directly affecting the allocation of resources. 
5.1.1 Illustration I: Salaries and work-related benefits of EU staff 
Interests to maintain material benefits are at the heart of conflicts over salaries and work-related 
benefits. As such they affect all EU institutions. The Council accords changes to staff rules, 
reforms and adaptations. Where they touch upon financial revenues of officials working in the 
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EU institutions, the EP and the Commission might see their benefits negatively affected. Such 
conflicts motivated litigation in at least 16 cases in our sample.5 
Salaries and pensions for officials working in the EU institutions are adapted every year. To 
this aim, the Commission proposes correction coefficients that adjust staff benefits to increases 
in overall cost of living. It was usual practice to time lag the coefficients to EUROSTAT data 
to technically ease calculation of the indices. However, in the midst of the financial crisis the 
Council refused to adopt the suggested coefficients. Given the serious and sudden deterioration 
in the economic and social situation the Council had decided to depart from the usual practice 
of time lagging since “the calculations, which came from the year before, brought a result that 
was unacceptable for the member states” (EP_1). Instead the Council used its role in the 
legislative process to ask for budget containment that would resonate with the austerity 
measures required in many EU member states. Yet, neither Commission nor Parliament staff 
was willing to accept this (CONS_1). The threat of lower than expected salary and pension 
adjustments for their officials motivated EP and Commission to launch a number of related 
annulment actions against the staff rules proposed by Council. Once the core case had been 
solved the other cases were withdrawn (e.g. C-453/12, C-68/13, cf. already C-272/02, C-
273/02, C-548/03, C-549/03). This case illustrates how material interest interacted with the role 
of institutions in decision-making. 
5.1.2 Illustration II: budget prerogatives 
A second case from our sample also illustrates the relevance of material motivations for 
litigants. As part of its budgetary prerogatives the EP originally held the final say on the major 
part of the European budget, the so-called non-obligatory budget. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty 
finished with the differentiation between obligatory and non-obligatory expenditure, 
empowering the Parliament for all but agricultural spending. The Treaty now calls for the 
Parliament and the Council to act in accordance with a special legislative procedure when 
adopting the budget (Art. 314.9 TFEU). Conflict emerged over the 2011 budget, when the 
Council sued the Parliament for having signed a budget that had not followed the procedural 
requirements of the special legislative procedure (C-77/11). This is one of the rare cases where 
the Council acted in the unanimous interest of its member states. In light of the internal demand 
to have agreement among the 28 member states the decision to litigate was brought about where 
                                                 
5 There is a further six cases for which information on the substance of the annulment conflict has been 
withdrawn and it is likely that these cases concern staff regulations as well. 
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clear-cut material gains overlapped with institutional interests to maximize its influence on the 
2011 budget.  
In sum, both cases underline that material gains are a relevant motivation to mobilize the law 
in horizontal annulments. Budget quarrels are known to be among the most stable sources of 
conflicts in political systems. And given the organization of decision-taking on remuneration it 
thus seems reasonable that material interests will continue to influence litigation, too. In 
horizontal annulment actions they are particularly likely to motivate litigation by Parliament. 
 
5.2 Policy interests 
Next to material gains, a decision to litigate can also be motivated by substantial policy interest. 
The ideological orientation of a group, such as organized interests or a political party, can 
explain a policy position. Where this ideology is at odds with a process or instrument chosen, 
or where it does not fit with the substance of an EU policy, conflict can emerge. Such conflict 
is analytically distinct from material motivations as it may occur independent of or even absent 
material motivation. 
The extensive literature on the legal mobilization of social movements and non-governmental 
actors that developed in the United States from the 1970s onwards shows how litigation can 
serve actors to secure their policy goals (Scheingold 1974) and how litigation systematically 
alters the substance of public policies (e.g. Yandle et al. 2011). Similar results are found in the 
EU, where women activists (Alter and Vargas 2000; Cichowski 2004), environmental 
organizations (Slepcevic 2009) and other social movements (Hilson 2002) have used litigation 
strategies before the CJEU as a means to advance their policy agenda. 
If this type of motivation for litigation appears particularly likely for social movements, it may 
also apply to the Council, the EP and even to the Commission. Since ideology matters even 
where these actors are formally independent from parties (e.g. Hartlapp 2014), we can 
reasonably expect that the willingness to defend a given policy line can explain legal 
mobilization of EU institutions against other EU institutions. Two cases from our database 
illustrate this motivation at play in litigant decisions. 
5.2.1 Illustration I: passenger rights 
Two closely related annulments launched by the EP against the Commission (C-318/04) and 
against Council (C-317/04) illustrate policy motivation. In the aftermath of the September 11 
terrorist attacks, the US tightened legal requirements for air carriers flying to or over the US. 
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Passenger Name Records (PNR) have to be made available to the US Department of Homeland 
Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Aware of the potential conflict this would 
pose for European data privacy rules, the Commission negotiated an international agreement 
(decision 2004/535/EC) and the Council followed with a decision (2004/496/EC). The adopted 
rules clashed with the view the EP held on data privacy. For nearly a decade, in particular since 
the adoption of the first EU data privacy directive, civil liberty rights had been high on its 
agenda (Long and Quek 2002). Consequently, to the Parliament the agreements signed with the 
US did not only mean a setback, but it considered them a violation of fundamental individual 
rights (COM_2). The EP won the case and thus was able to defend a policy position that it had 
since developed further, prominently via the framework regulation 679/2016 for the processing 
of personal data. Given the strong position, the EP held on data privacy before and after 
litigation, it seems clear that securing existing policies and preparing the ground for future 
instruments had been a core motivation to go to court in this case. 
5.2.2 Illustration II: pirates 
Policy interests clearly motivated litigation in the so-called pirate case (C-658/11), too. As a 
part of the EU’s anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, the Council had signed an 
agreement with Mauritius regulating the transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized 
property from the EU naval force NAFOR to the Republic of Mauritius. Similar agreements 
exist with other African states. They contain rules that assure treatment in accordance with 
international human rights standards and prohibit torture, unfair trials and death penalties. At 
the same time, they allow transfer to countries in the region rather than trial and detention in 
Europe (Riddervold and Rosén 2016). Parliament stressed the importance of international 
human rights. Moreover, it called for information rights to secure democratic legitimation of a 
sensible international agreement. The final ruling of the Court argumentatively underlines the 
substantial motivation when ruling in favour of the EP and stressing democratic principles. 
Much like for the budget prerogatives in the case above, institutional interests seem to have 
mattered alongside ideological goals. 
In sum, both cases illustrate how policy goals might motivate litigation for public actors under 
particular constellations. Interestingly, human rights as well as data privacy are high on the 
agenda of the EP. Here, keeping pledges to its constituency it had actively pushed policy-
making at earlier occasions. However, unlike in classical legislative procedures Parliamentary 
influence on policy-making was limited in the decision at hand for its close link to development 




5.3 Institutional logic 
In his seminal work on the functioning of democracies Downs (1957) argues that political actors 
are not interested in particular policies. Instead, what motivates them is institutional power and 
positions. This motivation should matter for conflict between EU institutions as we know that 
part of the EU's expansion of powers is due to competence creep, in particular initiated by the 
Commission. This makes the CJEU a likely venue to decide about conflicts that emerge from 
this competence creep. Adam even suggests that governments may use annulment actions ‘for 
reasons that go beyond the desire to win a legal dispute [... and instead…] bring more general 
questions concerning the design of institutions […] to the CJEU’s attention’ (Adam 2016: 158). 
Across all three institutions litigation should be motivated by an interest to influence the 
distribution of decision-making competences in the long-term. 
5.3.1 Illustration I: external affaires 
Developments in the EU’s external affairs drive the ups and downs in figure 1. With each treaty 
change external affairs have seen competence changes and competence conflicts. In particular, 
over the last decade of EU integration, new positions have been created, such as the High 
Representative and new institutions such as the European External Action Service with its 
hybrid organizational structure and its mix of officials from national foreign services, the 
Commission and the EU’s diplomatic corps. While international trade is supranational, other 
closely related issues such as development aid are not. In this context the Commission, the 
Council and even the EP are seeking to keep or expand competences in an evolving area of EU 
policy-making. Interviewees from all three EU institutions describe tensions over competences, 
and more pronounced since the Maastricht treaty and particularly after adoption of the Lisbon 
treaty (COM_2, EP_1, CONS_1). 
The oldest and certainly most prominent horizontal annulment case demonstrates institutional 
interests at play in external affairs: the AETR case (C-22/70 Commission v. Council). The 
Council had authorized Member States to negotiate and conclude an international transport 
agreement that included social rules for the protection of drivers (ex. Art. 75). It did so by 
claiming that transport was an area of Member State competence. Given that the Commission 
had been transferred powers on international trade policy, the Commission felt that the Council 
had overstepped its competences and launched an annulment to shift the legal base, so 
negotiation powers would fall on the Commission (Art. 207, ex. Art. 133 TEU). The Court 
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agreed that the existence of acquis communitaire harmonizing social provisions in transport 
(Regulation 543/69) necessarily vested any international agreement in community powers – 
consequently excluding concurring powers of Member States. Winning the case enabled the 
Commission to expand external policy competences to areas where the Community holds 
internal competences. The principle of “implied powers” (Cremona 2011) was raised to the 
echelon of primary law with the Nice Treaty. 
 
5.3.2 Illustration II: comitology 
Yet, conflict over institutional competences is not limited to external affairs. The Lisbon Treaty 
also changed the comitology procedure by redefining delegating and implementing acts (Art. 
219 and 201 TFEU). Negotiations were controversial and the resulting treaty articles are 
complex and give rise to different interpretations (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen 2015). 
The choice between delegating and implementing acts is not neutral in terms of institutional 
competences. While delegating acts empower the supranational institutions, implementing acts 
give more influence to the member states in the Council – much as under the pre-Lisbon 
comitology regime. Interviewees described that “the institutions try to win in Court what they 
could not win when negotiating the Treaty” (CONS_1) and that “obviously we do not try to 
turn into delegated [acts] whatever must be in implementing, but in borderline cases we would 
tend to shift to delegated acts” (EP_1). A number of annulment actions on seemingly unrelated 
topics such as toxic substances or terrorism emerged from this broader competence struggle. In 
C-65/13, the Parliament took the Commission to court over the question whether a pre-Lisbon 
empowerment to establish a European Information Exchange System on Labour Markets 
(EURES) could still be used as an implementing act even if the definition of implementing act 
had changed. Another example is C-88/14 where the Council and the Parliament questioned the 
use of an implementing act to alter the annex of a visa regulation. The Parliament argued that 
this would qualify as change to a legislative act, hence requiring a legislative process (EP_1). 
Seeking to uphold institutional influence the Commission litigated against the Council and the 
Parliament (cf. also C-427/12, C-540/13, C-317/13, C-679/13). 
Across our cases, competence struggles seem by far most frequent at the origins of annulment 
actions. They are motivated by institutional interests to keep or expand influence on EU policy-
making and implementation. Evidence suggests that all EU institutions mobilize the law to 
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serve these institutional interests, but that again the organizational opportunity structures in the 
EU system matter. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed litigation motivation in horizontal annulment actions. Focusing EU 
institutions as claimants it adds to existing research that has analyzed litigation running 
vertically across levels of the EU system. We raised attention for public actors as a so far 
neglected group of litigants and provided new descriptive information on litigant patterns. The 
Commission goes to court more frequently, while the EP still substantially outnumbers the 
Council in launching annulments against other institutions. Analysis of conflicts between the 
EU institutions and the ensuing litigant decisions is particularly relevant at a time when the rise 
of tensions and crises on the global scene has intensified the potential for conflict within the 
EU. 
To explore causes for these differences in litigation activity across the three institutions we 
build on existing opportunity structure research. We show that political and legal opportunity 
structures can explain some of the differences Importantly, differences in manpower as well as 
the historically limited standing right of the Parliament seem to matter for higher mobilization 
of the Commission. Yet, we argue that is particularly helpful to add organizational features to 
the structures that shape litigation decisions. As the final decision taker, the Council can most 
easily assure its position in the legislative process, reducing incentives to annul new acts. The 
Commission as the agenda-setter, in contrast, faces strongest incentives to mobilize. The EP 
does so increasingly, too, in particular in areas where it is not a co-legislator (external affairs) 
and since the Maastricht treaty. Moreover, internal decision taking provides the Commission 
with most room to launch annulment actions, the Parliament is somewhat constrained by 
plenary approval, while the Council needs proactive agreement from all member states to 
launch an annulment. Case studies explored how these organizational features interact with 
actor motivations. Clear-cut material and institutional motivations allow for legal mobilization 
even where the internal organizational process to decide to go to Court is demanding. More 
complex and potentially controversial policy motives, in turn, lead to legal mobilization where 
the organizational structure across and inside institutions provides greater opportunities to take 
the legal avenue. 
In sum, this paper explored organizational opportunity structures that situate actors in a political 
system and take their inner working seriously as explanation for legal conflicts between the EU 
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institutions. We can expect differences in who decides about litigation and where decisions to 
go to Court are taken for private actors, as well as for actors at the national level. Organizational 
structure as a category is very likely, to matter in these other claimant groups, too. Future 
research could benefit from considering this factor more systematically in explaining what 




Annex: List of Interviews 
European Commission, Legal Service 16 June 2016 COM_1 
European Commission, Legal Service 16 June 2016 COM_2 
European Parliament, Legal Service 17 June 2016 EP_1 
Council, Legal Service 17 June 2016 CONS_1 
European Commission, DG TRADE 17 June 2016 COM_3 
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